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In the 1980 Presidential election, all three major television networks predicted Ronald Reagan the winner before 8:00 p.m. Pacific
Standard Time.l Consequently, Jimmy Carter conceded defeat before
any west coast polls had c10sed.~As a result of Carter's early conces1. Waters, Peacock's Night to Crow, NEWSWEEK,
NOV.17, 1980, a t 82. NBC predicted
Reagan the presidential winner a t 5 1 5 Pacific Time. At that time, only 5% of the total vote
had been reported. Although ABC and CBS did not report Reagan the winner until two hours
later, they still reported the outcome prior to the closing of west coast polls. Id.
2. Id. Many adversaries of early election predictions claim that President Carter, by conceding the election early, was as irresponsible as the networks. Carter was aware that his statement would be nationally broadcast. The President, therefore, should have been sensitive to
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sion, many west coast voters allegedly declined to vote.3 Congress responded by asking the media to refrain from broadcasting early election returns and predictions and by threatening to pass legislation if
Several states have also intervened to
the request was disregar~ied.~
prohibit election predictions by restricting exit polling, the technique
used to collect prediction data.6 Claiming that these restraints would
impair their first amendment rights, newscasters. have voiced their
intention to continue announcing prediction^.^ Whether the first
the effect conceding early would have on voters. For most voters, President Carter's actions
provided a major incentive to stay a t home or even leave the polling lines. Early Election Returns and Projections Affecting the Electoral Process: Hearings Held Jointly Before the
Comm. on House Administration and the Subcomm. on Telecommunications, Consumer Protection and Finance of the Comm. on Energy and Commerce, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. 107 (1981)
(statement of Congressman Robert Matusi) [hereinafter cited as Hearings].
3. November 2, 1980 has been termed the day of "uproar in the west." The news media
reported people leaving the lines outside polling places and drivers on their way to the polls
going home. Hearings, supra note 2, a t 3 (statement of David Broder, Washington Post). Losers
of close local races claimed that the broadcasts had cost them the election. For example, Representative A1 Ullman (D-OR) lost in 1980 by 1 % of the vote. Additionally, 20 year veteran
James E. Coreman of California lost by 796 votes in a race where more than 19,000 people
voted. The former candidate argued an increased voter turnout would have favored their campaigns. The early election predictions destroyed the "coattail effect," which each candidates
had counted on. Friendly, Exit Polls of Voters Pose Question of News u. Effect on Elections,
N.Y. Times, Dec. 20, 1983, $ A, at 22, col. 1.
4. Broder, TV Newsmen to Continue Exit Poll Use, Washington Post, July 22, 1983, $ A,
a t 3, col. 1.
Two bills aimed a t eliminating early election predictions were introduced during the 97th
Congress. H.R. 3556 proposed sealing the ballots in presidential elections until all polling places
closed. H.R. 3557 provided for a uniform time for the closing of polling places in all regular
elections of Representatives to Congress, United States Senators, and electors of the President
and Vice President of the United States. Neither bill, however, was passed. Election Day Practices and Election Projections: Hearings Held Before the Task Force on Elections of the
Comm. on House Admin. and the Subcomm. on Tele-Communications, Consumer Protection,
and Finance of the Comm. on Energy and Commerce, 97th Cong., 1st & 2d Sess. 45-48 (198182) [hereinafter cited as Election Hearings].
Congress' failure to pass legislation may be, in part, an attempt to demonstrate good faith
to the judiciary. Legislation aimed a t curtailing early election predictions will probably face
constitutional challenges. Thus Congressmen may hope the courts, when considering these challenges, will take judicial notice of the legislature's attempts to exhaust all possible alternatives
before resorting to legislation.
REV.STAT.
5. Hawaii has also passed legislation aimed a t preventing exit polling. HAWAII
$ 12-52 (1976) (restricting solicitation within a 1000 feet radius from polling places). Both
Washington and Idaho have passed state resolutions asking Congress to prevent early electoral
returns. Hearings, supra note 2, a t 185-86, 188-89. Additionally, the California legislature has
proposed changing its anti-solicitation statute from prohibiting exit polling within 100 feet to
prohibiting it within 500 feet. Id. a t 180.
6. Hearings, supra note 2, a t 180. Contra L.A. Times, Mar. 8, 1984, $ VI, a t 11, col. 1
(citing 16 local television and radio stations that agreed not to release election-day exit poll
predictions until polls closed); telephone interview with Bob Furnand, Political Editor of the
Cable News Network (July 2, 1984) (The Cable News Network [CNN] has agreed to refrain
from broadcasting early election pxojections. CNN will, however, broadcast actual results as
they become available regardless of' whether all polls are closed.).

Heinonline - - 36 U. Fla. L. Rev. 490 1984

19841

EARLY ELECTION PREDICTIONS

491

amendment protects these early predictions has become a paramount
issue in recent elections years.
This note analyzes the constitutional ramifications of legislative
attempts to restrict early election predictions. First, specific congressional proposals and state legislative enactments will be examined.
Secondly, the various standards of review the Supreme Court applies
when government regulation threatens to infringe upon first amendment free speech will be examined. Lastly, this paper will examine
the competing interests involved in early election predictions and will
conclude that limitations on this process would be an unconstitutional impairment of the public's first amendment rights.

Network television stations base their early election predictions
on data obtained from voters at polling sites.? Voters are questioned
regarding their socio-economic background, the candidate they seBy revealing the characterlected, and the reason for their sele~tion.~
istics and electoral decisions of American voters, exit polls enable
networks to predict election outcomes before any actual vote totals
are a~ailable.~
Claiming that outcome predictions undermine national elections,
many critics advocate the prohibition of exit polling.1° In 1980, west
Recently, the three major networks agreed not to project the results o f presidential races i n

a state until that state's polls have closed. This agreement does not, however, preclude networks from projecting a winner prior to the closing o f west coast polls. Clouding TV's Crystal
Jan. 28, 1984, at 47. Such a proposal is -not necessarily a new policy for the netBall, TIME,
works. See Broadcast Media Hearings, infra note 10, at 12 (statement o f George Watson, VicePresident ABC News) (in 1982 ABC would not predict any race i n any state until all polls had
closed i n that state).
7. See generally Levy, The Methodology and Performance of Election Day Polls, 47 PUB.
OPINION
Q. 54, 56 (1983).
CBS pollster, Warren Mitofsky, pioneered exit polling i n 1967. Since then, it has become
the predominate method b y which networks report electoral winners. Like a Suburban Swimming Pool, n h 5 , NOV. 17, 1980, at 97.
8. Levy, supra note 7 , at 56.
9. Reid, Exit Polls Had Pols Heading for Their Tom-Toms, Washington Post, Mar. 1,
1984, 3 A, at 7 , col. 1. During the 1984 New Hampshire Presidential primary, exit pollsters
predicted Gary Hart the winner at 12:OO p.m. No actual vote totals had been reported at that
time. Id.
10. See generally Hearings, supra note 2; Election Hearings, supra note 4; Broadcast
Media in Elections: Hearings Held Jointly Before the Task Force on Elections of the Comm.
on House Administration and the Subcomm. on Telecommunications, Consumer Protection,
and Finance of the Comm. on Energy and Commerce, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. 98-172 (1983)
[hereinafter cited as Broadcast Media Hearings]; Broadcast Media and Early Election Predictions: Hearing before the Comm. on House Administration and Subcomm. on Energy and Finance, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. 98-171 (1984).
Several government and media officials, in an effortto combat exit polling, have proposed
alternative methods o f conducting election day voting. Networks advocate a nationwide uni-
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coast voter turnout dropped as much as two percent from the previous presidential election." Following the announcement of network
predictions, many of the voters standing in line a t the polls left and
most west coast polling sites reported a sharp decline in voter turnout.12 Arguably, by reducing the incentive to vote, election predictions based on exit polls could have a drastic effect on the "one-man,
one-vote" system of go~ernment.'~
Conversely, many people dispute claims that exit polling deleteriously affects voter turnout. East and west coast voter turnout decreased by a roughly equal amount in the 1980 presidential election.14
Furthermore, opponents of an exit poll ban assert that no empirical
data exists to support the contentions made by proponents of
legislation.16

Concerned that statu1;ory limitations on exit polling might be unform voting period. TV Newsmen to Continue Exit Poll Use, Wash. Post, July 22, 1983, § A, at
3, col. 3. Congressman Mario Biaggi and Senator S.I. Hayakawa propose a different alternative.
The Biaggi proposal would move election day to Sunday and stagger voting hours so that polls
everywhere across the nation would open and close a t the same time. Hearings, supra note 2, a t
110. Another propcsal would revise voting times based on time zones, i.e., east coast polls would
be open from 11:OO a.m. to 8:00 p.m. Eastern time and west coast polls would be open from 8:00
a.m. to 500 p.m. Pacific time. Id. a t 131. Each of these proposals, however, is inherently flawed
for several reasons. Perhaps the largest problem is that networks are able to produce election
predictions within hours after the polls open. Poll closings, therefore, are irrelevant absent cooperation from networks. See Hearings, supra note 2, a t 130-31 (statement of Daniel E. Boatright, Senator of California) (detailed discussion and critique of proposed legislative remedies).
11. Hearings, supra note 2, a t 84-85. The "most careful" analysis of the effect of election
predictions suggests a 2.7% decrease in voter turnout. Id. a t 4.
12. Id. a t 233-35 (reactions from election board inspectors regarding premature election
reports). See also id. a t 331, 337 (charts summarizing impacts of exposure to news coverage on
the turnout of eligible voters); Election Hearings, supra note 4, at 122 (chart assessing the
distribution of reported times of hearing projections and concession speech).
13. See infra notes 97-110 and accompanying text.
14. Hearings, supra note 2, td 84-85.
15. Broder, supra note 4. In 1964, Lang & Lang conducted a study of California voter
reaction to media projections of a dohnson victory four hours before the polls closed. Research
since then has consistently confirmed their finding that mass media broadcasts on election day,
reporting both probable and actual returns, have a negligible effect on both the nonvoting rate
and the outcome of Presidential elections. Hearings, supra note 2, at 303. See generally DuBois, Election Night Projections and Voter Turnout in the West, 1983 AM. POL.Q. 349 (study
finding exit polling does not affect voter turnout); Hearings, supra note 2, a t 306 (statement of
Professor Laura Appleton) (empirical study of exit polling has shown no discernible effects on
voter turnout).
The news media claim a high degree of accuracy in their early election predictions. See
Broadcast Media Hearings, supra note 10, a t 12 (statement of George Watson, Vice President
ABC News) (in 1982 ABC was 100% accurate in their prediction of 69 senatorial and gubernatorial races); id. a t 18 (statement of Van Gordon Sauter, President CBS News) (in 1982 CBS
news was 100% accurate in its prediction of 36 senatorial and gubernatorial races).
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Congress has not yet passed restrictive legislation.
Instead, a joint house committee17 recently passed several resolutions
asking networks to voluntarily refrain from projecting election results
prior to poll closings.18 House of Representatives Concurrent Resolution 227 specifically calls upon the television and radio industries to
refrain from predicting election results until all polls throughout the
country have closed.19 Additionally, House of Representatives Resolution 395 forcefully urges the news media to adopt guidelines to ensure that data from exit polls will not be used prior to poll c l o s i n g ~ . ~ ~
16. Hearings, supra note 2, at 247 (statement of Mark Gaede, Field Representative of
Congressman Les AuCoin) ("These proposals clearly avoid a Fit Amendment confrontation."). See Columbia Broadcast Sys. v. Democratic Nat'l Comm., 412 U.S. 94, 110 (1972)
("Congress intended to permit private broadcasting to develop with the widest journalistic freedom consistent with its public obligation."). See generally Hearings, supra note 2; Election
Hearings, supra note 4; Broadcast Media Hearings, supra note 10.
17. The joint committee is formally titled The Committee on House Administration and
the Subcommittee on Telecommunications, Consumer Protection and Finance of the Committee on Energy and Commerce.
18. To date, Congress has passed over eight resolutions and proposed more than six bills
aimed at curtailing exit polling. Gainesville Sun, June 27, 1984, § A, at 7 col. 1. See Election
Hearings, supra note 4, at 7-8, 12-13, 21-23, 35-36, 45-46, 47-48.
19. H.R. CON.RES. 227, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. (1983) provides as follows:
(1) in the 1980 and 1982 general elections, broadcasters made projections of election
results in many States while polls were still open;
(2) those projections may have decreased voter participation and affected close
elections;
(3) early projections of election results undermine the belief of individuals in the
importance of their votes-a belief that is essential in a democratic society;
(4) rapidly developing technology makes it possible that projections of election results will be made earlier and in more elections;
(5) a uniform poll closing time will not solve this problem if projections of election
results are based on exit interviews; and
(6) with the approach of the 1984 election, there is continued concern about the
impact of early projections of election results on the electoral process. SEC. 2. In light of
the findings set forth in the first section of this resolution, it is the sense of the Congress
that, to maintain the appropriate balance between freedom of the press and the integrity
of the electoral process, in future elections (1) broadcasters and other members of the news media should voluntarily refrain
from projecting election results before the polls close; and
(2) the news media, including industry, trade, and professional organizations,
should adopt guidelines to assure that data from exit interviews are not used to project election results before the polls close.
Resolution 227 has since been amended to read identically to the language contained in
resolution 321. See infra note 21.
20. H.R.CON.RES.98th Cong., 2d Sess. (1984) provides as follows:
Calling upon the television and radio industry and other members of the news media
voluntarily to refrain from projecting Presidential election results or making predictions
in Presidential elections on election day until all the polls throughout the United States
have closed.
Whereas in 1980, on the west coast, electronic media made Presidential election
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More recently, the enti:re House adopted Resolution 321 which calls
for networks to refrain :from characterizing or predicting any election
results until the race in question has ended.21 Subsequently, the
projects a t 330 postmeridian;
Whereas the voter turnout in 1980 was the lowest since 1948;
Whereas in 1980, 3 per centurn of registered voters in the Western United States
reported that they did not go to the polls because of early election projections by television and radio;
Whereas in 1980, countless eyewitnesses reported individuals leaving polling places
following announcements by broadcasters of a projected Presidential winner;
Whereas rapidly developing technology and techniques make it probable that projections will be made earlier in future elections;
Whereas a decline in voter participation is an unacceptable trend for a healthy, vibrant political environment;
Whereas early election projections do not serve any significant societal purpose and
are unnecessary and potentially damaging to the political process and voter
participation;
Whereas the right of American to cast informed and educated votes is the comerstone of our democracy and freedom of the press is intended to further that basic right;
and
Whereas Congress has a compelling interest and inherent duty to protect the voting
rights of all Americans and to seek an increase in participation in the electoral process:
Now, therefore, be it
Resolved, That the House of Representatives calls upon the television and radio
industry and other members of the news media voluntarily to refrain from projecting
Presidential election results or making predictions in Presidential elections on election
day until all the polls throughout the United States have closed.
21. H.R. CON.RES. 321, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. (1984) provides:
Resolved by the House of Representatives (the Senate concurring), That the Congress
finds that (1) in the 1980 and 1982 general elections, broadcasters made projections of election
results in many States while polls were still open;
(2) those projections may have decreased voter participation and affected close
elections;
(3) early projections of election results undermine the belief of individuals in the
importance of their votes - a belief that is essential in a democratic society;
(4) rapidly developing technology makes it possible that projections of election results will be made earlier and in more elections, especially in States with more than one
poll closing time (which States might consider adopting a single closing time);
(5) if projections of election results are based on exit interviews and the news media
do not voluntarily refrain from making those projections before the polls close, then a
uniform closing time will not solve this problem; and
(6) with the approach of the 1984 election, there is continued concern about the
impact of early projections of election results on the electoral process.
SEC.2. In light of the findings set forth in the first section of this resolution, it is the
sense of the Congress that, to maintain the appropriate balance between freedom of the
press and the integrity of the (electoralprocess, in future elections
(1) broadcasters and other members of the news media should voluntarily refrain
from characterizing or projecting results of an election before all polls for the ofice
have closed; and
(2) the news media, including industry, trade, and professional organizations,
should adopt guidelines to assure that data from exit interviews are not used to char-
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United States Senate joined the House in adopting the res0lution.2~
A congressional resolution is merely the adoption of a motion concerning subject matter which would not typically constitute a stat~ t e As
. ~
a result,
~
a congressional resolution does not carry the force
Thus, networks
of law and no penalties exist for non~ompliance.2~
face no legal liability for continuing to predict election results. A resolution may, however, have the effect of law if both houses of Congress and the President approve
House Resolution 321 may well
Therefore although networks
become law through this pro~edure.2~
have no present legal duty to comply with the mandate of House
Resolution 321, their noncompliance may encourage future statutory
regulation.
The absence of election prediction regulations evinces congressional awareness of the delicate balance between free speech and the
interests of government in preserving the integrit5; of the electoral
process. If Congress acts on its threats to statutorily restrict exit polling,>this legislation is certain to encounter constitutional challenges.
American courts must, therefore, stand ready to determine whether
curtailing exit polling and early election predictions is permissible
under the Constitution.

Historically, the judiciary has paid great deference to the press??
A robust press promotes free and open discussion. Free speech is,
therefore, considered a preeminent right under democratic the0ry.2~
acterize or project results of an election before all polls for the office have closed.

'

22. Reaves, Stifle Exit Polk;?, 70 A.B.A. J. 33 (Nov. 1984).
23. BLACK'S
LAWDICTIONARY
1178 (5th ed. 1979).
24. Id. The distinction between a joint resolution and a concurrent resolution of Congress
is that the former requires the approval of the President while the latter does not. Id.
25. Id. A resolution passed in both houses of the legislature, signed by the presiding officers of both houses and approved by the President has the effect of a law as that term is used
in the Constitution. A joint resolution signed by the President may alter, modify, or create law.
See 6 Op. Att'y Gen. 680,692 (1854). See also Oklahoma News Co. v. Ryan, 101 Okla 151,153,
224 P. 969, 972 (1924) (extending this principle to the states).
26. See supra notes 24-25.
27. J. NOWAK,
R. ROTUNDA
& J. YOUNG,
CONSTITUTIONAL
LAW859-60 (1983) [hereinafter
See, e.g., Richmond Newspapers, Inc.v. Virginia, 448 U.S. 555,576 (1980)
cited as J. NOWAK].
("without some protection for seeking out the news, freedom of the press would be eviscerated"); Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S.665,691 (1972) (news gathering qualifies for first amendment protection). See generally Note, The Right of the Press to Gather Information, 71
COLUM.
L. REV.838 (1972) (suggesting the news media's most important function is to'sewe as a
conduit of information).
28. Historically, the first amendment has enjoyed a preferred position among other constitutional rights. The concept of a preferred position for the amendment arose in dicta in
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Accordingly, courts have rarely allowed the first amendment to be
abridged in furtherance of governmental interest^.^^
T o withstand constitutional attack, a statute regulating free
speech must survive close judicial scrutiny. Where laws threaten to
restrict speech, courts typically balance the various conflicting interests involved.s0 In balancing these interests, courts focus on the governmental regulation's purpose, the first amendment rights abridged,
and the severity of the abridgement.31 A court will vary its level of
scrutiny depending on the degree of first amendment infringement.32
United States v. Carolene Prod. Co., 304 U.S. 144 (1938). In Carolene, Chief Justice Stone
suggested in a footnote that congressional limitations on the first amendment should be narrowly construed. Five years later, the Court explicitly held that freedom of speech has a preferred position. Murdock v. Pennsylvania, 319 U.S. 105, 115 (1943). See generally J. NOWAK,
supra note 27, a t 864-67.
Nowak explores the first amendment in terms of both the preferred position of free speech
and the absolutist view. Under the absolutist view the first amendment would not be subject to
balancing by definition. Rather, the judiciary would have to invalidate every law no matter how
incidentally it burdened free speech. Recognizing the impracticality of this view, Nowak suggests that if in fact speech is not an absolute right, it is certainly in a preferred position to
other rights in the Constitution. Id. See also Cox, Freedom of the Press, 1983 U. ILL.L. REV.3.
The theory that first amendment protection of free speech is essential to an intelligent selfgovernment in a democratic sctciety was strongly advocated by Alexander Meiklejohn.
Meiklejohn asserted that the objective of the framers was to help American citizens understand
their own political institutions. Under Meikeljohn's analysis, therefore, citizens should have
FREESPEECHAND
access to all available information in the political spectrum. A. MEIKLEJOHN.
ITS RELATION
TO SELFGOVERNMENT
(1948). See also L. TRIBE,
A ~ R I C ACONSTITUTIONAL
N
LAW
576 (1978) (discussion of Milton's "market place of ideas" theory); Polsby, Buckley u. Valeo:
The Special Nature of Political Speech, 1976 SUP.CT. REV.1, 6-8 (collective interest in free
speech provides mechanism for citizens to exercise self-government).
29. See infra note 34.
30. See, e.g., Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, 425
U.S. 748 (1976) (state's interest in preserving the integrity of the pharmaceutical profession
held incidental to the first amendment right of citizens to receive information on prescription
drug prices); Young v. American Mini Theaters, 427 U.S. 50 (1976) (state interest in avoiding
concentration of "adult movie theaters" was weighed against zoning restrictions prohibiting the
location of the theaters within 1(H)O feet of each other; slight burden on speech held to be
justified by that interest); Largent v. Texas, 318 U.S. 418 (1943) (state interest in regulating
dissemination of religious views weighed against discretionary sales licensing system; burden on
free speech was too great to uphold the state's interest).
31. See Konigsberg v. State Bar of California, 366 U.S. 36 (1961). In Konigsberg, Justice
Harlan, writing for the majority, presented his theory of judicial balancing. Harlan suggested an
approach for examining legislative regulations which appear to encroach on the guarantees of
the first amendment. When a valid governmental interest exists, the Court must weigh that
interest against the traditional guarantees of free speech. The first amendment may not be
suppressed unless the government can justify the need for suppression. Id. a t 49-51. See also L.
TRIBE,
supra note 28, a t 580-84; Frantz, The First Amendment in Balance, 71 YALEL.J. 1424
(1962).
32. Compare Widmar v. Vincent, 454 U.S. 263, 269-70 (1981) (a government regulation
which restricts speech based on its content will be invalidated unless the government can
demonstrate the regulation is necessary to serve a compelling state interest and narrowly drawn
to meet that purpose) with Heffron v. International Soc. for Krishna Consciousness, 452 U.S.
640, 648 (1981) (a content-neutral government regulation will be upheld as long as the regula-
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Courts generally employ a pure balancing of interests when the
governmental regulation involved is not intended to control s p e e ~ h . 3 ~
The courts weigh the regulations' effect on expression against the
. ~content-neutral
~
governmental interest served by its e n f o r ~ e m e n tA
regulation is permissible if it is the least restrictive means of'accomplishing a valid governmental
and if it merely restricts the
time, place, or manner of the speech.3eAdditionally, reasonable alternative methods of communication must be available to both speakers
and listeners?'
In contrast to content-neutral regulations, content-based regulations favor certain modes of communication over others.3s These regulations are presumptively unconstitutional under the first amendment.39 The Supreme Court has allowed content based restrictions
only when the governmental interest involved is compelling, substantion merely rejects the time, place, or manner of speech). See also Stone, Restrictions of
Speech Because of its Content: The Peculiar Case of Subject Matter Restrictions, 46 U. CHI. L.
REV.81, 82 (1978).
33. The Court's balancing analysis under which it weighs competing interests arose from
dicta in Schneider v. State, 308 U.S. 147,161 (1939). See Bogen, Balancing Freedom of Speech,
38 MD. L. REV.387, 387 (1979).
34. City Council of Los Angeles v. Taxpayers for Vincent, 104 S. Ct. 2118, 2128 (1984).
See, e.g., Metromedia, Inc. v. City of San Diego, 453 U.S. 490 (1981) (city's interest in avoiding
visual clutter was sufticient to justify a prohibition of billboards); Young v. American Mini
Theaters, 427 U.S. 50 (1976) (city regulation requiring "adult movie theaters" to be 1000 feet
apart upheld against first amendment challenge); Lehman v. City of Shaker Heights, 418 U.S.
298 (1974) (Court upheld city's prohibition of political advertising on its buses stating that the
city was entitled to protect the aesthetic and efficiency aspects of of its mass transit system);
Adderly v. Florida, 385 U.S. 39 (1966) (right of individuals to publicly protest was subordinate
to city ordinance prohibiting demonstrations on jailhouse property).
35. Schneider v. State, 308 U.S. 147, 162 (1939). See Stone, supra note 32, at 86.
36. City of Los Angeles v. Taxpayers for Vincent, 104 S. Ct. 2118, 2130. See L. TRIBE,
supra note 28, a t 682-83.
37. See, e.g., Consolidated Edison Co. v. Public Sew. Comm'n, 447 U.S. 530, 542-43
(1980) (statute prohibiting utility companies from using bill inserts to discuss political matters
left no alternative mode of communication).
38. See, e.g., Widmar v. Vincent, 454 U.S. 263, 269-70 (1981) (regulations restricting
speech based on its content will be invalidated unless the government demonstrates a compelling interest in upholding the regulation and the restriction is narrowly tailored to meet the
government's needs); New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 270 (1964) (content restriction on expressive activity undercuts the "profound national commitment to the principle
that debate on public issues should be uninhibited, robust and wide-open").
39. The Court has defined three exceptions to the general principle that content-based
restrictions are unconstitutional. A content-based regulation will be held unconstitutional unless a compelling governmental interest justifies the regulation, the speech itself is unprotected
by the first amendment, or the speech poses a clear and present danger. L. TRIBE,
supra note
28, a t 670. See, e.g., Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 485 (1957) (obscene language not
protected by the &st amendment); Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 572 (1942)
(fighting words not protected by the f i s t amendment); Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444,447
(1969) (speech may be regulated if it is designed to incite or produce imminent unlawful acsupra note 27, a t 873-82, 954-57, 1008-027; Bogen, supra note 33, a t 441.
tion). See J. NOWAK,
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tial or cogent.40
The court applied a content-neutral analysis in Young v. American Mini theatre^.^^ In Young, a Detroit "anti skid-row" ordinance
prohibited locating adult movie theaters within 1,000 feet of any two
other "regulated uses"42 or within 500 feet of residential areas.43 An
adult theater operator brought suit alleging the statute44was an im~ ~ Court began its analysis
permissible content based r e ~ t r i c t i o n .The
by considering the content which was to be statutorily controlled.
The Court found that the city's general zoning law required all motion picture theaters to satisfy certain locational requirement^.^'
Therefore, the statute merely regulated the place where adult films
could be shown.47 Because these restrictions constituted merely a
permissible time, place, or manner regulation, the Court's contentneutral analysis considered only whether the city's community interest in avoiding the conce:ntration of adult movie theaters outweighed
the public's first amend~nentright to receive i n f o r m a t i ~ n .I~t ~concluded the city's interest in the present and future character of its
neighborhoods justified u.pholding the statute.4e
40. United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 376-77 (1968). See, e.g., Carey v. Brown, 447
U.S. 455,461 (1980) (for a government regulation to be sustained, the government must demonstrate the legislation serves a "substantial" state interest); Regents of University of California
v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 299 (1978) (a state must demonstrate a "compelling" governmental
interest when burdening a class of persons); Bates v. City of Little Rock, 361 U.S. 516, 524
(1960) (the state must demonstrate a "cogent" interest to justify abridgement of the first
amendment).
41. 427 U.S. 50 (1976). See generally Comment, Young u. American Mini Theaters, Inc.:
A Limit on First Amendment Protection, 12 NEW ENG.
L. REV.391 (1976); Brest, The Supreme
Court 1975 Term, 90 HARV.L. REV.1 (1976).
42. 427 U.S. a t 54. The zoning ordinance defined regulated uses as theaters, bookstores,
liquor stores, pool halls, pawnshops and other similar activities. Id. a t 52 n.3.
43. Id. a t 52.
44. The Detroit Michigan ordinance defined "Adult Motion Picture Theater" as: "an enclosed building . . for presenting material distinguished or characterized by an emphasis on
matter depicting, describing or relating to 'Specified Sexual Activities' or 'Specified Anatomical
Areas'." Id. a t 53 n.5.
45. Id. a t 55. The controversy centered on the distinction between types of adult theaters.
The Detkoit zoning ordinance differentiated between theaters featuring sexually explicit movies
and those which do not. Id. a t 56.
46. Id. a t 62.
47. Id.
48. Id. a t 62-63. Detroit argued its ordinance was necessary to the community under the
theory of inverse zoning. Inverse zoning suggests cities forbid certain businesses from locating
in particular areas under the theoly that concentration of these businesses are injurious to a
neighborhood. See id. a t 54 & n.6. ,4 neighborhood can prevent deterioration by forbidding the
formation of such concentrations. See id. Detroit's first inverse zoning ordinance was passed in
1962. The city added "adult bookstores" to the list of regulated uses in 1972. Brest, supra note
41, a t 196-97 n.5.
49. 427 U.S. at 72. The Court concluded the city's interest in "the present and future
character of its neighborhoods" justified an incidental restriction on the first amendment. Id.

.
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In contrast to the Young case, the Supreme Court decision of Police Department v. Mosely60illustrates the approach taken by courts
in analyzing content-based regulations. Mosely addressed a Chicago
city ordinance which prohibited all picketing within 150 feet of a
school unless the picketing involved a peaceful labor dispute.61 The
Court determined that, in order to withstand constitutional scrutiny,
any government restriction selectively excluding a particular type of
speech must serve a substantial governmental interests2 and be narrowly tailored to meet a specific goal.ss Although Justice Marshall,
writing for a unanimous court, noted that the government could justify the selective exclusion of persons from a public forum in a few
rare instances, such as where necessary to prevent public disorder,
such justifications would be carefully scrutinized." The Court con50. 408 U.S. 92 (1972).
51. Id. at 92-93. The Supreme Court considered Mosely along with Grayned v. City of
Rockford, 408 U.S. 104 (1972). Grayned invalidated an almost identical ordinance which the
Illinois Supreme Court had upheld. 408 U.S. at 94.
The Mosely Court characterized picketing as a method of expressing an idea which is subject to broad state regulation. 408 U.S. at 97. The Mosely Court recognized, however, that state
regulation must give way to free speech principles when these regulations threaten to suppress
certain ideas. Mosely agreed with Justice Black's opinion in Cox v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 536
(1965) which stated:
[B]y specifically permitting picketing for the publication of labor union views [but
prohibiting other sorts of picketing], Louisiana is attempting to pick and choose among
the views it is willing to have discussed on its streets. It thus is trying to prescribe by law
what matters of public interest people whom it allows to assemble on its streets may and
may not discuss. This seems to me to be censorship in a most odious form, unconstitutional under the First and Fourteenth Amendments.
408 U.S. at 97-98.
52. 408 U.S. at 99.
53. 408 U.S. at 101 & n.8. The city argued the restriction is merely a device for preventing
disruption of the school. In contrast, the Court held the city ordinance described picketing in
terms of the content it wished to control. The essence of content-control is censorship, a concept impermissible under the first amendment. Id. at 99.
See also Carey v. Brown, 447 U.S. 455 (1980). In Carey, the Court invalidated an Illinois
statute which prohibited all picketing of residences or dwellings except for peaceful picketing of
employment places involved in labor disputes. Relying on Mosely, the Court concluded the
state's goal of protecting privacy could not be advanced in a way which allowed picketing only
in certain areas of the city. The restriction permitted the expression of views on one particular
subject and thus was repugnant to the h t amendment. The majority explicitly stated, however, that an anti-residential statute would be upheld if it was uniform and non-discrimiitory.
Id. at 470.
54. 408 U.S. at 98-99. The city argued it had a substantial interest in preventing school
disruption. While recognizing the need for order in the city school system, the Court concluded
that Chicago had failed to meet its burden. The Court noted that the city itself had previously
determined that peaceful labor picketing during school hours was not an undue interference
with school. Id. at 100. Cf. Tinker v. Des Moines School Dist., 393 U.S. 503 (1969) (school
prohibition against wearing ann bands invalidated absent proof that the rule was necessary to
avoid substantial interference with school discipline).
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cluded that peaceful labor picketing during school hours did not unduly interfere with school activities. Thus, the city was unable to sustain its heavy burden and the Court invalidated the content-based

Two recent federal district court decisions exemplify the contrasting levels of scrutiny which the Supreme Court might apply to the
exit poll bans proposed :by states.6e Dissatisfied with the unenforceability of the congressioinal resolutions, the Florida6' and Washingt o d Bstate legislatures have imposed regulations prohibiting exit polling.6BPredictably, these regulatory schemes have been challenged as
unconstitutional infringements on first amendment rights. Viewing
the regulation as a content-based restriction of speech, the Federal
Middle District Court of Florida found the statute unconstit~tional.~~
The Washington court, however, in a cursory declaratory judgment
and order, apparently vi,ewed a nearly identical statute as contentneutral and upheld it as a permissible time, place, manner
re~triction.~'
A. Washington State: The Content-Neutral Approach
Daily Herald v. Muni.oe2 was the first case to directly address a
state exit poll law. Munro dealt with a Washington state statute
which made conducting an exit poll within 300 feet of a polling place
.~~
challenged the statute as an uncona m i s d e m e a n ~ r Newscasterse4
55. 408 U.S. a t 102.
56. See Clean-Up '84 v. Heinrich, 590 F. Supp. 928 (M.D. Fla. 1984); Daily Herald Co. v.
Munro, No. C83-840T (W.D. Wash. July 11, 1984).
57. See FLA.STAT.3 104.36 (1983) (prohibits solicitation within 100 yards of any polling
place).
58. See WASH.REV.CODEANPI.3 29.51.020 (1983) (prohibits solicitation within 300 feet of
polling place).
59. See also supra note 5.
60. 590 F. Supp. a t 928.
61. No. C83-840T a t 1-2.
62. Id.
63. See WASH.REV.CODEANN. 3 29.51.020 (1983). The Washington statute provides as
follows:
(1) On the day of any primary, general or special election, no person may, within a polling place, or in any public area. within three hundred feet of any entrance to such polling place:
(a) Do any electioneering; (b) Circulate cards or handbills of any kind; (c) Solicit
signatures to any kind of petition; (d) Engage in any practice which interferes with
the freedom of voters to exercise their franchise or disrupts the administration of the
polling place; or (e) Conduct tiny exit poll or public opinion poll with voters.
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stitutional restriction of speech and ~ o m m e n t a r y The
. ~ ~ information
gathered from polling data enabled the newscasters to report voting
trends as well as electoral outcomes.B6Requiring newsmen to stand at
least 300 feet from the election area allegedly prevented them from
gathering information and disseminating it to the public. The challengers argued that this hindrance violated the public's constitutional
right to receive information and prevented the press from fulfilling
its obligation of disseminating it.B7
Viewing the statute as content-neutral, the Munro court seemed
to apply an analysis largely identical to that used in Young.es The
court viewed the Washington statute as a restriction on the place
where exit polling could occur, thereby rejecting the plaintifPs argument that the legislation restricted a certain area of protected
speech.69The court did not explicitly state the regulation was a valid
time, place, or manner restriction. Rather, the brief opinion merely
listed each requirement necessary to uphold a valid time, place, or
manner restriction and stated that the Washington statute satisfied
. ~ ~ the court's superfluous analysis, exit polthose r e q ~ i r e m e n t sUnder
(2) No person may obstruct the doors or entries to a building in which a polling place is
located or prevent free access to and from any polling place. Any sheriff, deputy sheriff,
or municipal law enforcement officer shall prevent such obstruction, and may arrest any
person creating such obstruction. (3) No person may:
(a) Except as provided in RCW 29.34.157, remove any ballot from the polling place
before the closing of the polls; or (b) Solicit any voter to show his or her ballot.
(4) No person other than an inspector or judge of election may receive from any voter a
voted ballot or deliver a blank ballot to such elector. (5) Any violation of this section is a
misdemeanor under RCW 9A.20.010, and shall be punished under RCW 9A.20.020(3),
and the person convicted may be ordered to pay the costs of prosecution.
64. American Broadcasting Co. (ABC), Columbia Broadcast System, Inc. (CBS), National
Broadcasting Co. (NBC), The New York Times Co. and The Daily Herald Co. were co-plaintiffs
in this action. Plaintiffs' complaint a t 1, Daily Herald Co. v. Munro, No. C83-840T (W.D.
Wash. filed Apr. 20,1984). The Daily Herald Company is a subsidiary of the Washington Post.
Wash. Post, Dec. 18, 1983, at 4, col. 4.
65. Plaintiffs' complaint a t 9, Daily Herald Co. v. Munro, No. C83-840T (W.D. Wash.
filed Apr. 20, 1984).
66. See id. a t 6-8.
67. See generally id. a t 10.
68. See No. C83-840T a t 2. In viewing the statute as "content-neutral" the Munro order
conformed to reasoning typically employed by the Supreme Court in cases when the regulation
is not intended to control speech. See id. See, e.g., Pell v. Procunier, 417 U.S. 817 (1974);
Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104 (1972); Talley v. California, 362 U.S. 60 (1960);
Schneider v. State, 308 U.S. 147 (1939). See also J. NOWAK,
supra note 27, at 864-78; Brest,
supra note 41, a t 196-205; Stone, supra note 32, a t 81.
69. See No. C83-840T at 1-2. See also supra notes 64-65 and accompanying text.
70. See No. C83-840T at 1-2 (the state of Washington has a legitimate and compelling
interest in regulating orderly elections, the statute is the least restrictive means of accomplishing that interest, and it is neither vague nor overbroad). Cf. United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S.
367, 377 (1968) (a government regulation is justified if it furthers a substantial governmental
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ling was not unconstitutional. Rather, the regulation merely sought
to govern the permissible area in which exit polling could be conducted. Thus, the statute constituted a valid time, place, manner re~ t r i c t i o n Accordingly,
.~~
the court employed a balancing test to determine whether the government interest involved outweighed the
In upholding
public's first amendment right to receive inf~rmation.~'
the statute, the court noted that both the state's interest in maintaining orderly polls and the government's interest in preserving west
coast votes justified the restraint on exit polls.73
B. Florida: The Content-Based Approach
In contrast, a Florida federal district court employed a contentbased approach and invalidated a statute strikingly similar to the one
in Munro. In Clean-up '84 u. H e i n r i ~ h ?a~Florida statute which imposed criminal sanctions on individuals soliciting signatures within
300 feet of a polling site76was challenged by a political action committee.76 Based on the committee's arguments, the court held the
statute violated the first amendment guarantees of freedom of speech
and a s s ~ c i a t i o n . ~ ~
In reaching the decision, the Heinrich court weighed the state's
interests in preserving the integrity of the electoral process against
citizens' first amendment rights.78 Unlike Munro, however, the court
interest, the governmental interest is directed a t the conduct of the speaker rather than the
speech, and the regulation is the least restrictive means of accomplishing the government's
goal).
71. See No. C83-840T at 1-2. The Court did not explicitly state the restriction was a valid
time, place, and manner regulation. The court's brief order merely listed each requirement necessary to uphold a valid time, place, and manner restriction and stated that the Washington
statute satisfied these restrictions. Id.
72. See No. C83-840T a t 2 (W.D. Wash. July 11, 1984).
73. See id. The court's order was very brief. I t explicitly stated that no genuine issue
existed as to any material fact in controversy. The Washington restriction only incidentally
restricted plaintiffs' ability to gather news. The state, however, was found to have shown a
compelling governmental interest which justified upholding the state law. The opinion did not
cite any evidence or reasoning to support its holding. Id. a t 1.
74. 590 F. Supp. 928 (M.D. Fla. 1984).
75. FLA.STAT.§ 104.36 (1983) provides as follows:
Solicitation near polling places. -- Any person who, within 100 yards of any polling place
on the day of any election, distributes or attempts to distribute any political or campaign
material; solicits or attempts to solicit any vote, opinion, or contribution for any purpose;
solicits or attempts to solicit a signature on any petition; or, except in an established
place of business, sells or attempts to sell any item is guilty of a misdemeanor of the first
degree, punishable as provided in s. 775.082, s. 775.083, or s. 775.084.
76. 590 F. Supp. at 929.
77. Id. a t 930.
78. Id. at 930-31.
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viewed the statute as a content-based regulati~n.?~
Thus, under the
Mosley test, the state had to prove both that a substantial governmental interest was involved and that the interest was narrowly tailored to meet a specific goal.80
In invalidating the statute, the Heinrich court rejected the state's
argument that exit polling restrictions were necessary to maintain order at the polls.81 The court refused to uphold a law which, based on
some vague specter of future disorder, substantially infringed on first
amendment rightsa2 Furthermore, the court chastised the state for
not adopting a less restrictive means of insuring orderly voting proced u r e ~ ?The
~ state argued that because poll workers themselves could
not maintain orderly elections, there was a need for legislation. The
court held, however, that these problems would have to be remedied
in some way other than a "blanket prohibition" of signature solicitations at the polls on election day.84

The Supreme Court will almost certainly consider the constitutionality of state exit poll laws and the curtailing of early election
predictions in the near future.86 Alternatively, if federal legislation
aimed at newscasts is passed, the Court is likely to encounter a constitutional challenge to the law?s In either instance, critics will level
a number of charges at exit poll laws. Critics would argue that exit
poll laws constitute an unreasonable time, place, and manner regulation which leaves no alternative method of communication. They
may also argue the classification of information solicitation based on
question content violates the first amendment. Finally, they may assert that laws regulating newscasters are unconstitutional prior restraints on protected communication. The Supreme Court will have
79. Id. The court stated the right to free debate on political issues is one of the highest
values safeguarded by our Constitution, a right that cannot be infringed without a showing of
compelling justification. Although the State can enact reasonable regulations to ensure orderly
elections, those regulations may not place "substantial and direct restrictions on the ability of
candidates, citizens, and associations to engage in protected political expression, restrictions
that the First Amendment cannot tolerate." Id. (quoting Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 59
(1976)).
80. 408 U.S. at 101-02.
81. 590 F. Supp. at 930.
82. Id.
83. Id. at 930-31.Testimony indicated at least two centers for political discussion were
within 300 feet of polling places. Under the statute, a person soliciting signatures for a petition
on election day at one of these sites could be charged with a misdemeanor. Id. at 930.
84. Id. at 931.
85. See supra notes 5 & 59 and accompanying text.
86. See supra notes 15-24and accompanying text; infra notes 133-37and accompanying
text.
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to develop an appropriate constitutional analysis to resolve these
issues.
A. Levels of Scrutiny
In considering constitutional questions, courts assess the specific
classification of the speech, the nature of the forum, and the conflicting interests involved. Liberty of speech and press is not an absolute
right.s7 The limits of these rights must always be determined in light
of the particular subject matter involved.
The first amendment affords protection in varying degrees to different categories of speech. Traditionally, full protection extends to
.~~
pure speech, such as the right to criticize the g o ~ e r n m e n t Commercial speech which advertisles a product or service for business purposes has historically been subject to substantial governmental regul a t i ~ n Presently,
.~~
however, commercial speech appears to receive
~~
obscenity, libelous
full first amendment p r o t e c t i ~ n .Conversely,
87. Near v. Minnesota, 283 U.S. 697, 708 (1930).
88. Tinker v. Des Moines School Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 505-06 (1969).
The free speech clause of the Constitution was a natural response to the authoritarian
government of the middle ages. Political authority was considered to have derived from God.
Thus, criticizing secular authority would result in damnation. Political censorship continued for
the three centuries prior to the Declaration of Independence. In an effort to appear superior to
the Roman Catholic Church, English royalty required the suppression of ideas antagonistic to
the government. The publication of statements criticizing the King was considered seditious
libel which was equivalent to criminal assault. Further, all writing had to be licensed prior to its
publication. Although the practice of censorship declined in colonial America, the doctrine of
seditious libel continued. While promoting free speech which was in accordance with its political views, the pre-revolutionary legislature severely punished its critics. At the time the Constitution was drafted, the idea that liberty of the individual was essential to a free state finally
prevailed. Thus, the framers adopted the first amendment, which was intended to eliminate
censorship and destroy the doctrine of seditious libel in America. J. NOWAK,
supra note 27, at
858-61. See, e.g., Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15 (1971) ("offensive" criticism of the draft must
be permitted under the first amendment). See generally Z. CHAFEE.FREESPEECH
IN THE UNITED
STATES1-35 (1946) (discussion of the history of free speech); Mayton, Seditious Libel and the
Lost Guarantee of a Freedom of Expression, 84 COLUM.
L. REV.91 (1984); Rabban, The First
Amendment in Its Forgotten Years. 90 YALEL.J. 514 (1981).
89. Compare Valentine v. Chrestensen, 316 U.S. 52 (1942) (the Constitution does not protect speech for profit) and Breard v. City of Alexandria, 341 U.S. 622 (1951) (state interest in
protecting citizens privacy may prevail against rights of door to door salesmen) with Murdock
v. Pennsylvania, 319 U.S. 105 (1943) (state may not prevent door to door solicitation when the
motive is religiously oriented). See a k o Capital Broadcasting Co. v. Mitchell, 333 F. Supp. 582
(D.D.C. 1971), aff'd sub nom. Capital Broadcasting Co. v. Acting Attorney General, 405 U.S.
1000 (1972) (because the Consitution protects advertising less rigorously than other communication, the Court permitted the federal government to ban cigarette advertising on television);
1080;
Rotunda, The Commercial Speech Doctrine in the Supreme Court, 1976 U. ILL.L. FORUM
Note, Constitutional Protection of Commercial Speech, 82 COLUM.
L. REV.720 (1982).
90. In Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizen's Consumer Council, 425 U.S.
748 (19761, the Court held that free speech extended to any exchange of ideas or information
that might enable individuals to malte better informed choices. Id. Thus, under Virginia State
Bd. of Pharmacy, states can only relylate misleading advertising. See, e.g., Bates v. State Bar,
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speech and "fighting words'' are not within the scope of first amendment protecti~n.~'
The Constitution treats the right of free and open political debate
as a value of paramount importance. Accordingly, political speech,
receives the fullest protection
which also includes electoral ~peech,9~
under the first amendment.9s The first amendment prohibits restrictions on candidates, citizens, and associations engaged in political activity. If a government regulation restricts the offering of ideas in the
electoral arena, the law will be invalidated unless demonstrable evidence of a compelling governmental interest exists.B4
Applying this standard, the Supreme Court in Brown v. Hartlagee6found the government's interest in guaranteeing fair elections
subordinate to first amendment rights.Bs In Brown, the Court explicitly recognized Kentucky's legitimate interest in preserving the integrity of its elections.B7Nevertheless, a unanimous Court found that, on
balance, a candidates' right of free speech outweighed the state's interest in either prohibiting the buying of votes or controlling factual
rnis~tatements.~~
The Court did distinguish certain areas which the
433 U.S. 350 (1977) (state may not regulate attorney advertising); Carey v. Population Serv.
Int'l, 431 U.S. 678 (1977) (invalidated a prohibition of any advertisement of display of contraceptives); Bigelow v. Virginia, 421 U.S. 809 (1975) (Virginia could not regulate advertisements
for New York abortions even though abortions were illegal in Virginia).
91. See, e.g., Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476 (1957) (obscenity); Beauhamais v. Illinois, 343 U.S. 250 (1952) (libelous utterances); Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568
(1942) (fighting words). The theory that certain forms of speech do not deserve first amendment protection has been labeled the two-level theory of free speech. The two-level doctrine
arose from dictum in Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568 (1942). The Chaplinsky
Court held that speech which is utterly without redeeming social worth should not receive constitutional protection. Kalven, The Metaphysics of the Law of Obscenity, 1960 SUP.CT. REV. 1,
26. But see L. TRIBE,
supra note 28, at 670 (suggesting the two-level theory of free speech has
lost much of its vitality).
92. See, e.g., Brown v. Hartlage, 456 U.S.45, 53 (1982); Mills v. Alabama, 384 U.S. 214,
218-19 (1966); Polsby, supra, at 19-20. Polsby perceives a candidate's free speech interests as
political speech. This theory suggests that all speech concerning elections is encompassed
within the full first amendment protection guaranteed to political speech. Id.
93. See Regan v. Taxation with Representation of Washington, 103 S. Ct. 1997, 2002
(1983). See Brown v. Hartlage, 456 U.S. 45 (1982) (first amendment has its fullest and most
urgent application in the case of regulation of the content of political speech); United States v.
United Auto Workers, 352 U.S. 567, 594 (1957) (Douglas, J., dissenting) ("The making of a
political speech . . . has always been one of the preferred rights protected by the Constitition."). See also Polsby, supra note 92, at 1.
94. Brown v. Hartlage, 456 U.S. at 53-54.
95. Id. at 45.
96. Id. at 62.
97. Id. at 52.
98. Id. at 52-53. Petitioner Brown was a candidate for election against incumbent Hartlage. In a campaign speech attacking Hartlage, Brown promised to substantially lower his salary if elected, thereby saving each taxpayer money. Shortly after the speech, Brown learned
that he had violated the Kentucky Corrupt Practices Act which prohibited candidates from
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state could justifiably regulate, such as prohibiting candidates from
offering monetary incentives in return for votes.99 Brown demonstrated, however, the heavy burden of proof the government must
meet to justify infringing on first amendment electoral speech.

B. Balancing of Competing Interests
Early election predictions fall within the broad scope of political
speech. A constitutional analysis of any legislation curtailing such
predictions must, therefore, weigh the intensity of each competing interest. Such an analysis s:hould precisely define the purpose and importance of both the govc!rnment's interests in preserving the integrity of the electoral procc?ss and the public's interests in protecting
free speech.
1. The Government's Interest in the Electoral Process

Both the state and federal governments have legitimate interests
in preserving the integrity of the electoral process. Insuring an alert,
responsible electorate ancl preserving the individual's belief in government is paramount to a democratic system.loOThe Supreme Court
has, therefore, consistently recognized the state and federal government's significant interest in sustaining the individual's active role in
the electoral proce~s.'~'Although the right to vote is not constitutionally protected per se,lo2the Court has referred to voting as a fundamental right preservative of all basic political and civil rights.loSThis
right has been extended to include the government's fundamental interest in preserving each citizen's vote.lo4Opponents of early election
predictions argue that ear:ly publication of election returns breeds apathy among voters and interferes with the government's constitumaking monetary promises in consideration for a vote. Brown thereafter retracted his statement. Subsequently Brown won the election and Hartlage filed suit. Id. a t 47-49.
99. Id. a t 55. The Court specifically recognized personal solicitation in exchange for a
specific agreement. Id.
100. First Nat'l Bank of Boston v. Belliotti, 435 U.S. 765, 788-89 (1978). See Buckley v.
Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 25 (1976); American Party of Texas v. White, 415 U.S. 767, 782 n.14 (1974).
But see Democratic Party of the United States v. Wisconsin ex rel. La Follette, 450 U.S. 107,
124-26 (1981) (state's compelling interest in preserving the overall integrity of the electoral
process, providing secrecy of the bnllot, increasing voter participation, and preventing harassment did not justify intrusion into first amendment protections).
101. See, e.g., Bellotti, 435 U.S. a t 787; United States v. United Auto Workers, 352 U.S.
567, 575 (1957).
102. San Antonio Indep. School Dist. v. Rodriquez, 411 U.S. 1, 35 n.78 (1973).
103. Reynolds v. Sims, 377 US. 533, 561-62 (1964).
104. Cf. Dunn v. Blumstein, 105 U.S. 330, 336 (1972) (" 'equal right to vote,' . . . is not
absolute; the States have the power to impose voter qualifications, and to regulate access to the
franchise in other ways").
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tional right to preserve voter confidence.lo6
In Reynolds v. S i r n ~ the
, ~ ~Supreme
~
Court acknowledged the
"undeniable" constitutional right of citizens to vote in state and federal elections.lo7Reynolds struck down an Alabama reapportionment
plan which ostensibly gave voters living in certain parts of the state a
weighted vote.lo8The majority believed the legislature's scheme contradicted its role as protector of the electorate.109
The Equal Protection clause requires that all citizens have an
equal vote, no matter where their homes may be located.l1° Therefore, the Reynolds Court held that an individual's right to vote is
unconstitutionally impaired when its weight is diluted in proportion
to votes cast in other districts.ll1 Like the reapportionment plan in
Reynolds, an early prediction of an election's outcome based on returns from the east may give voters on the east coast a more signscant role in deciding a presidential winner. Conceivably, this may
constitute an unconstitutional dilution of west coast votes.
Any early election prediction which could serve to reduce voter
incentive to go to the polls seems repugnant to the principles espoused in Reynolds.ll2 As distinguished from the Reynolds case,
however, the government's primary interest in regulating exit polling
is to safeguard a small fraction of the population from a premature
newscast. Citizens are not physically denied access to the ballot.
105. The 1980 election day "incident1' has caused widespread cynicism among reporters.
This loss of confidence has likely extended to the general public. One journalist commented
that on election day in 1980 over 83 million Americans voted in the presidential election. About
36,000 responded to exit polls. Levy, supra note 7, at 54. Mike Royko, a syndicated columnist,
called for Chicagoans to lie to exit pollsters during the 1984 presidential primary. Washington
Post, Mar. 16, 1984, $ B, at 1, col. 1. Further, Art Buchwald argued network polling methods
have become so sophisticated that no one west of the Mississippi need vote in order to decide a
presidential election. Los Angeles Times, Nov. 6, 1980, $ V, at 2, col. 1.
106. 377 U.S. 533 (1964).
107. Id. at 554.
108. Id. at 568.
109. See id. at 565.
110. Id. at 565-66. See also Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330,336 (1972) ("a citizen has a
constitutionally protected right to participate in elections on an equal basis with other citizens
in the jurisdiction"). The Reynolds Court analogized dilution of a citizen's vote to invidious
discrimination. An unequal vote due to your residence impairs basic constitutional rights under
the fourteenth amendment as much as a bar from the polls based on race. 377 U.S. at 566.
111. 377 U.S. at 566. See also Eva& v. Cornman, 398 U.S. 419,421-22 (1970) (residents of
a mental health institute have the right to vote equal to all other citizens of the state); Kramer
v. Union Free School Dist. No. 15, 395 U.S. 621, 626-28 (1969) (invalidating a state statute
granting the right to vote @ a school election to some citizens of requisite age and citizenship
but denying that right to other citizens with the same qualifications); Cipriano v. City of
Houma, 395 U.S. 701,706 (1969) (Louisiana law providing that only "property taxpayers" have
the right to vote in municipal utility bond elections is violative of the equal protection clause of
the Constitution).
112. See supra note 111and accompanying text.
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Rather, only their incentive to vote is diminished once a winner is
predicted. Therefore, while the government's interest in insulating
the election process from exit poll results may be significant, it is
probably not substantia:l enough to override first amendment
protections.
2. Constitutio~lalGuarantees of Free Speech

The Constitution's framers presupposed that free expression
without government intervention was essential to an informed electorate. At the time the first amendment was conceived, the government
seemed to pose the only potential threat to a free flow of information.lls This danger necessitated a constitutional provision which
would keep public information purveyors free from potential government control. Consequently, the framers enacted the free press clause
of the first amendment which leaves the press free to stimulate public discussion. Thus, the media enjoys constitutional protection predicated on the public's right to receive information.
The press is widely considered the most practical vehicle for
quickly disseminating information to the public as it becomes available.l14 The broadcasting media argues that delaying available presidential election information would be inconsistent with traditional
journalistic standards.l16 The media contends the function of a journalist is to report information in a timely and honest manner.l16
Therefore, most networks have chosen to disregard Congress' resolution advocating restraint in reporting exit poll results.l17 They contend that if the need to limit journalistic freedom is truly urgent,
113. J. NOWAK,supra note 27, at 860-61.
114. T h e media is the only system which can successfully spread information quickly and
accurately t o a country o f 215 million. Thus, without the large organization o f editors and reporters, self government would not work. Cf. Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 19 (1976) ("The

electorate's increasing dependence on television, radio, and other mass media for news and information has made these . . . modes o f communication indispensable instruments o f effective
political speech.").
T h e organized print and electronic media have the enormous resources required to seek
out, assimilate, and interpret information o f governing importance. "[T]elevisionhas replaced
newspapers as the primary source o f news for most Americans." Albert, The Federal Regulation of Radio and Television Newscasts, 34 U. FLA. L. REV. 309, 310 (1982). Over 56 million
Americans watch the early evening news broadcast by the three major networks. Id.
115. See generally Hearings, supra note 2; Election Hearings, supra note 4; Broadcast
Media Hearings, supra note 10; Broadcast Early Elections Hearings, supra note 10.
116. Hearings, supra note 2, nt 54. Veteran journalists have strongly asserted that, with
the exception o f the very rare instances when bodily harm might result, any attempt t o delay
reporting is a mistake. Many individuals agree. For example, President Kennedy suggested that
had he not restrained the New York Times from reporting the "Bay o f Pigs" landing, a great
disaster might have been averted. Id.
117. See supra note 6.
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Congress should pass binding corrective legislation.lls
The Supreme Court has vigorously protected the press' role in
disseminating electoral information. Both Brown and Reynolds explicitly recognized the paramount value of each individual's voice in
the electoral process.11e In Mills v. Alabama,120 the seminal case on
the interrelationship between first amendment rights and legislative
efforts to ensure "purer" elections, the Court unanimously invalidated a broadly based corrupt practices law.121 The Alabama statute
imposed criminal penalties on newspapers publishing editorials on
election day which concerned election issues.122The Mills Court acknowledged that the first amendment's major purpose was to protect
the free discussion of all matters pertaining to the political process.123
Overturning the lower court, the Supreme Court held that a state's
interest in limiting media influence in a public election was not compelling enough to suppress free speech.124
Under Mills, the government cannot silence the news media
merely because its news stories or editorial commentaries affect voting decisions. Mills might be distinguished from early election predictions, however, because the latter do not merely influence the voters' choice of candidates, but instead affect the voters' decision of
whether to vote at all. Notwithstanding this argument, Mills undoubtedly established that courts will strictly scrutinize government
actions barring the press from influencing voter opinions on election
day. Under this analysis, exit polling would be presumptively protected speech.
The Supreme Court has specifically recognized the public's right
to receive information from the broadcasting media. In Red Lion
~~~
Broadcasting Co. v. Federal Communications C o m m i ~ s i o n ,the
118. Broder, supra note 4.
119. See supra notes 95-99 & 106-11 and accompanying text.
120. 384 U.S. 214 (1966).
121. Id. a t 220.
122. Id. a t 215-16. On election day, an Alabama newspaper carried an editorial strongly
urging citizens to adopt a mayor-council form of government. Id. a t 215.
123. Id. a t 218. The Court discussed a t length the major role the press plays in a democratic society. A vital function of the press is to discuss those matters relating to the political
process. This includes discussion of all elected o a c i h . The press was designated to serve as a
"powerful antidote" to any abuses of government. Essentially, disseminating information about
candidates and elected o5ciak is an integral factor in a democratic society. Id. a t 219.
124. Id. a t 220.
125. 395 U.S. 367 (1969). The Red Lion decision consolidated two conflicting cases from
the federal courts of appeals. In Radio Television News Directors Ass'n v. United States, 400
F.2d 1002 (7th Cir. 1968), the Seventh Circuit held the FCC's "political editorial" and "personal attack" rules violated broadcasters' first amendment rights of free speech and commentary. Id. at 1020. In contrast, the District of Columbia Court of Appeals in Red Lion, 381 F.2d
908 (D.C. Cir. 1967), upheld the order requiring licensees to offer airtime to individuals person-
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Court upheld the Federal Communication Commission's right to impose the fairness doctrine on the broadcasting media.12eUnder the
fairness doctrine, broadcast stations must give equal time to editorial
r e ~ 1 i e s . lRecognizing
~~
television as the most optimum method for
disseminating information. to the greatest number of people, the
Court mandated adoption of the doctrine under first amendment
prin~ip1es.l~~
In effect, the Court found the public's right to receive
information outweighed the broadcasters right to stress selective
viewpoint^.'^^

The Red Lion decision permitted government infringement upon
free speech. This particular infringement, however, enhanced the
public's ability to receive full and accurate information. Red Lion
viewed television as a limited resource.130The government imposed
ally attacked on their television stations under t h e public's constitutional right t o receive all
information. See id. at 930. T h e Court affirmed Red Lion and reversed RTNDA. 395 U.S. at
401. For a further discussion o f Red Lion see generally Marks, Broadcasting and Censorship:
First Amendment Theory After Red Lion, 38 GEO.WASH.L. REV. 974 (1970); T h e Supreme
Court 1968 Term, 83 HARV. L. REV. 7 , 133-47 (1969) [hereinafter cited as 1968 T e r m ] ; Comment, Red Lion and the Fairness Doctrine: Regulation of Broadcasting "In T h e Public Interest", 11 ARIZ.L. REV. 807 (1969).
126. 395 U.S. at 400-01. In writing t h e Constitution, t h e framers could not have anticipated t h e advent o f t h e electronic broadcast media. Unlike the traditional written press, access
to t h e broadcasting media is very limited. T h u s , when some individuals gain access t o this
resource, others must b e denied. In response t o this problem, Congress has created a regulatory
agency, the Federal Communicationri Commission, aimed at upholding constitutional principles
in a limited media. T h e FCC requires each station t o have a license prior t o broadcasting. T h e
award o f t h e license may be subject t o reasonable regulations with goals other than the suppression o f ideas. Red Lion held this regulation is permissible because t h e right o f listeners and
viewers is paramount t o t h e rights o f broadcasters. Id. at 390. See generally J. NOWAK,supra
note 27, at 894-902; Geller & Lampert, Cable, Content Regulation and the First Amendment,
32 CATH.U.L. REV.603 (1983); Goldberg, Ross & Spector, Cable Television, Government ReguT 577 (1981); Lively & Leahy, Government
lation, and t h e First Amendment, 3 C O M M E N L.J.
and the Media: Regulating a First Amendment Value System, 31 U. FLA. L. REV. 913 (1979).
127. 395 U.S. at 369-70. See F'ub. L. No. 86-274, 3 1, 73 Stat. 557 (1959), amending 47
U.S.C. 3 315(a) (1958) (codified at 47 U.S.C. 3 315(a) (1982)) ( I f a licensee permits a candidate
for public office t o use a broadcasting station, he must afford equal opportunity to all other
candidates for that office.). T h e fairness doctrine requires all licensed broadcasters t o provide
equal opportunities t o individuals who have been personally attacked and t o legally qualified
candidates for office i f any one candidate in the race is permitted air time t o present views on
an issue o f current importance. See Note, Fairness Doctrine: Television as a Marketplace of
Ideas, 45 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1222, 1225 (1970); Zack, FCC and the Fairness Doctrine, 19 CLEV.ST.
L. REV. 579 (1970). Cf. generally Meyerson, T h e First Amendment and the Cable Television
L.J.
T 1
Operator: A n Unprotectiue Shield Against Public Access Requirements, 4 C O M M ~ N
(1981) ( t h e fairness doctrine does not extend t o cable television).
128. See 395 U.S. at 400-01.
129. See id. at 390.
130. Id. at 376. T h e Court espoused the views o f Congressman W h i t e , sponsor o f the Radio Act o f 1927. T h e Radio Act was t h e first piece o f legislation regulating broadcast frequency.
Congressman W h i t e asserted that "'[ilf enacted into law, t h e broadcasting privilege will not be
a right o f selfishness. It will rest upon an assurance o f public interest t o be sewed.' " Id. at 376
n.5.
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fairness doctrine was apparently considered the only way to guarantee equal and open access to this resource for the greatest number of
people.lS1

C. Constitutionality of Federal Legislation
Any curtailment of early election predictions would contravene
the Red Lion Court's mandate of equal access to the media.ls2 As
distinguished from the fairness doctrine, a government abolition of
election predictions would stifle rather than promote discussion.
Under the guise of protecting citizens' rights to a fair and honest
election, government would be limiting what citizens could see and
hear.
Congress has arguably acknowledged the possibility that a federal
exit poll restriction would unconstitutionally abridge the first amendment by its reluctance to pass a binding law for bidding exit polling.lSs The first amendment cannot be suppressed unless the government can prove a compelling state interest justifies the
suppression.1s4While the government has a fundamental interest in
preserving each citizen's vote,ls6 this interest is probably not compelling enough to deny the press the constitutional freedom they are
entitled to enjoy.
The Supreme Court recently held a state's interest in preserving
the overall integrity of the electoral process did not justify interference in the protected realm of first amendment rights.lS6Under such
a rule, any federal exit poll legislation would seem to be clearly un131. See id. a t 377. "[Tlhe 'public interest requires ample play for the free and fair competition of opposing views,. . . ."' Id. See also 1968 Term, supra note 125, a t 141 (broadcasters
should not systematically exclude ideas); Barron, Access to the Press - A New First Amendment Right, 80 HARV.
L. REV.1641,1647-5G (1967) (discussion of marketplace of ideas theory).
132. See supm notes 125-31 and accompanying text. See generally 1968 Term, supra
note 125, a t 138-46; Comment, supra note 125, at 807-21.
133. See supra notes 16-25 and accompanying text.
134. E.g., Widmar v. Vincent, 454 U.S. 263, 270 (1981).
135. Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330,336 (1972) ("By denying some citizens the right to
vote, such laws deprive them of a 'fundamental political right, . . .preservative of all rights.' ")
(quoting Reynolds v. Sims,37 U.S. 533, 562 (1964)).
136. Democratic Party of the United States v. Wisconsin ex re1 La Follette, 450 U.S. 107,
125-26 (1981). In La Follette, the Democratic Party challenged the constitutionality of Wisconsin's open primary election, which entitled citizens to choose their preferred candidate without
regard to party preference. The law further required that Democratic delegates to the National
Convention be bound to cast votes in the same allocations as the statewide primary. Consequently, the National Democratic Party refused to seat the Wisconsin delegates, arguing that
such a primary did not truly represent those who had openly stated affiliation with the party.
Id. a t 110-13. The party charged the state regulation impermissibly impaired the Democratic
Party's freedom of political association protected by the first amendment. Id. at 113. The state
argued it had a compelling interest in preserving the integrity of the electoral process, increasing voter participation in primaries, and preventing the harassment of voters. Id. at 124-25.
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constitutional. Proponents of federal exit poll restrictions argue such
legislation is necessary for the fair administration of elections. Advocates further assert that such a statute is important to the democratic process by preserving the incentive to vote for a portion of the
electorate.lS7Under recent case law, however, these arguments would
not pass judicial muster. 'The court will probably choose to favor the
needs of the electorate a t large over those of the small fraction of the
populous affected in order to preserve the level of speech the Constitution safeguards.

D. Constitutional Analysis of State Exit Poll Laws
Determining the constitutionality of exit poll legislation presents
a clash of fundamental rights. Each right is essential to a democratic
system and each is constitutionally based. Inherent in our democratic
system, however, is a jutlicially mandated hierarchy that elevates
some first amendment interests over others. The varying levels of
constitutional scrutiny illustrate this hierarchy.lsS
Recent Supreme Court decisions have adopted a policy of favoring the federal government's interests where the government seeks to
preserve the integrity of the electoral process.lse For example, in
Buckley v. Valeo,140the Court found the federal government's interest in administering fair elections sufficiently compelling to incidentally burden the first amendment.141 The Buckley Court considered
the constitutionality of limitations on campaign expenditures and
contribution^.^^^ In sustaining the disclosure and reporting provisions
of the Federal Election and Campaign Act,14Sthe Buckley Court held
137. See supra note 11.
138. See supra notes 36-40 and accompanying text.
139. See, e.g., Federal Election Comm'n v. National Right to Work Comm., 103 S. Ct.
552, 559 (1982) (first amendment associational rights superceded by congressional interest in
enacting a statute limiting certain corporate funding); Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 29 (1976)
(government's interest in preventing corrupt campaign contributions in federal elections is paramount to first amendment free speech).
140. 424 U.S. 1 (1976).
141. Id. a t 29.
142. Id. a t 6-7. The Court upheld the individual contribution limits, the disclosure and
reporting provisions, and the public financing schemes included in the 1974 amendments to the
Election Campaign Act of 1974. The Court, however, found limitations on campaign expenditures by independent individuals, groups or a candidate repugnant to the Constitution. Id. a t
143.
143. Federal Election Campaign Act of 1971, Pub. L. No. 92-225, 86 Stat. 3 (1972) (codified in scattered sections of 2, 18 and 47 U.S.C. (Supp. I1 197211, amended by Pub. L. No. 96187,93 Stat. 1339 (1979) (current version a t 2 U.S.C. $3 431-455 (1982)). For an in-depth analysis of the constitutional impacts of the Federal Election Campaign Act see Note, The Unconstitutionality of Limits on Contributions to Independent Expenditure Committees, 35 U. RA.
L. REV.316 (1983).
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the government's duty to prevent corrupt campaign practices justified a slight impediment of first amendment rights.144
In contrast to its support of laws upholding the integrity of the
electoral process, the Court has invalidated regulations which suppress campaign information. The Brown decision r e a r m e d the
Court's position that voters need to hear all electoral information
even if such information is slightly tainted.146Even prior to Brown,
the Mills Court had refused to silence information essential to the
l ~ ~ stated that the government's interest
voters election c h 0 i ~ e . Mills
in providing sterile conditions on voting day was an inadequate justification for the suppression of speech.14' Under this rationale, newspapers have published public opinion polls through the day of an
election. Arguably, exit polls are merely public opinion polls.14s Thus,
the policy of prohibiting government regulations which silence information pertinent to voter choice should apply.

E. Proposed Resolution of the Munro-Heinrich Disparity
Conceivably, a court may consider both the Heinrich and Munro
decisions in determining the constitutionality of exit poll legislation.
The approaches taken in the two decisions pose alternative methods
for deciding the exit poll dispute. An analysis of both Heinrich and
Munro in the context of past Supreme Court decisions, however,
reveals the appropriate constitutional resolution for exit poll
regulation.
1. Analysis of the Munro Approach

Since its earliest decisions concerning the first amendment, the
Supreme Court has occasionally permitted the state to curtail speech
when necessary to advance a significant government interest.14s A
government regulation aimed at accomplishing a compelling purpose
is constitutionally permissible if it is a reasonable regulation affecting
144. 424 U.S. a t 27-29.
145. 456 U.S. a t 61. See supra notes 92-99 and accompanying text.
146. 384 U.S. a t 219. See supra notes 120-24 and accompanying text.
147. 384 U.S. a t 219-20.
148. Citizens arguably have a constitutional right to predicate their votes on electoral
returns if that information is ascertainable. Thus, just as many citizens consider public opinion
polls in their electoral decisions, individuals should be allowed to consider exit poll results.
149. See, e.g., Hefion v. International Soc'y for Krishna Consciousness, 452 U.S. 640
(1981) (state's interest in maintaining order a t a fairground justified a place restriction on
speech); Ohralik v. Ohio State Bar Ass'n, 436 U.S. 447 (1978) (states may forbid solicitation by
attorneys for pecuniary gain to protect its citizens from adverse consequences); Friedman v.
Rogers, 440 U.S. 1 (1979) (state's interest in protecting citizens from potentially misleading
advertising justified a ban on the use of trade names by optometrists).
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only the time, place, or manner of speech.160 Under the content-neutral analysis of a time, place and manner restriction, the court focuses on the conduct of the speaker rather than the speech itself.
Taking this approach, the Munro court held that prohibiting pollsters from approaching within 300 feet of a polling site was a reasonable restriction on the place of the pollster.161
In contrast to the Munro judgment, the Heinrich court, in a brief
discussion of the time, place, and manner restrictions created by the
exit poll law, criticized the use of a content-neutral analysis.162Testimony at the Heinrich trial indicated that at least two centers for political discussion were within 300 feet of polling places. Under the
exit poll statute, a person soliciting signatures on election day at one
of these sites could be charged with a mi~demeanor.'~~
The Heinrich
court found the state collld not produce evidence to justify this re~ t r i c t i 0 n . lIn
~ ~comparison, Munro cited no evidence in support of its
holding validating a simi:lar statute.166
Interestingly, Munro was decided in Washington, one of three
states most effected by the polling technique.166The exit poll controversy arose out of concern for west coast voters. Conceivably, the
150. Members of the City Council of Los Angeles v. Taxpayers for Vincent, 104 S. Ct.
2118, 2130 (1984). In Vincent, a recent decision concerning electoral speech, the Court upheld a
city ordinance restricting the posting of signs on public property. Id. at 2135-36. A local candidate who campaigned chiefly by posting signs around town challenged the statute as an unconstitutional abridgement of free speech. Id. a t 2122. The Vincent Court rejected the petitioners'
argument. The Court recognized the ordinance did place a slight burden on free speech. Id. a t
2128. The candidate's right to post signs, however, was considered subordinate to the City's
esthetic and economic interests. Id. a t 2130, 2135-36. The Los Angeles ordinance merely restricted the manner by which the candidate could campaign and, therefore, was valid as a reasonable time, place, or manner restriction on speech. See id. a t 2134.
151. See Munro, No. C83-840T a t 2.
152. Cf.590 F. Supp. a t 930.
153. Id. The Jewish Towers and the Sheet Metal Workers Union hall were within 300 feet
of a Tampa polling site. Both buildings were centers for political discussion where the solicitation of signatures was likely to occiu. Under the statute, an individual solicitating signatures in
one of these buildings on election day could be charged with a misdemeanor. Id.
154. Id. The only evidence the state presented to demonstrate its compelling need to preserve the statute was one witness who testified that an "otherwise inoffensive young man"
made a coy comment following the witness' refusal to sign the petition and that two out of the
124 precinct captains claimed some dissatisfaction with the order of the elections. The state
further argued that the statute war1 needed because the deputies charged with maintaining order a t the elections received only twenty minutes of instruction and thus might be unprepared
to handle possible disruption. Id.
155. See No. (283-840T a t 2.
156. Early election predictioris most effect Washington, Oregon, and California because
their polls close three hours later than those in east coast states. The government officials
championing this legislative reform are primarily from the western states. These individuals are
protecting both their constituents and perhaps themselves because decreased voter turnouts
may negatively affect their own elections. See supra note 3. See generally Hearings, supra note
2; Election Hearings, supra note 4.
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judge took a paternalistic attitude in deciding this issue. The declaratory judgment and order was a brief synopsis citing no legal precedent. The court recognized, however, the possibility that first amendment infringements could result from its order upholding a 300 foot
ban on exit polling as a reasonable "place" restriction.lK7
Courts often promote government interests through the guise of
time, place or manner restriction^.^^^ For example, in International
Society for Krishna Consciousness v. Eaves,'K9 the Fifth Circuit upheld as a valid place restriction a state statute prohibiting religious
speech in an airport except at designated places. The designated
places, however, were small booths located in isolated areas of the
airport.leOThis effectively prohibited the speakers from having any
type of effective voice. Nevertheless, the court held that the government had a compelling interest in regulating activities at the airport
and that the statute only incidentally burdened free speech.lsl
As in the Eaves case, requiring pollsters to stand 300 feet from an
election booth undercuts the effectiveness of their speech. From a
distance of 300 feet, pollsters can only obtain a sparse sampling of
the voting public, thereby rendering accurate exit poll predictions
impossible. Consequently, newscasters would be unable to broadcast
accurate results even though the Court has recognized the right to
broadcast news as constitutionally protected. Upholding the validity
of a polling restriction would terminate the first amendment protection of exit polling and would effectively achieve the purpose of a
unilateral exit poll ban.ls2
157. No. C83-840T at 1.
158. See, e.g., Members of the City Council of Los Angeles v. Taxpayers for Vincent, 104
S. Ct. 2118 (1984). In Vincent, the Court held an ordinance prohibiting a candidate from posting campaign signs still left ample alternatives for communications with the electorate. Id. at
2133. The Vincent Court specifically suggested the use of alternate means of communication.
Id. The "reasonable alternatives" left by the statute, however, are rather irrational. "The average cost of communicating by handbill is . . . likely to be far higher than the average cost of
communicating by poster." Id. at 2137 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
Under Vincent, candidates may turn
the media to communicate their messages. The
media, however, is a much more costly alternative than posting signs around town.An individual with sparse resources may be unable to run a successful campaign. The statute's seemingly
"reasonable alternatives" are essentially violative of an open candidacy system.
159. 601 F.2d 809 (5th Cir. 1979). See ako HeEron v. International Soc'y of Krishna Consciousness, Inc., 452 U.S. 640 (1981). A state regulation restricting religious solicitation by Hari
Kriishna followers relegated the group to a small booth on a Minnesota fairground. Id. at 644.
The statute effectively silenced the religious group's voice because in order for an individual to
hear what the followers had to say, the individual had to choose to approach the religious
group. This effectively mooted the Krishna's speech, because most individuals were hesitant to
approach the group.
160. 601 F.2d at 826-30.
161. Id. at 830.
162. See supra text accompanying notes 5 & 10.
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Time, place, or manner restrictions are constitutionally permissible because they are less likely to distort public debate.ls3 Theoretically, under a time, place, or manner restriction, the information the
restriction affects is ultimately disseminated. In practice, however,
content-neutral restrictions may impair the communication of some
messages more than others.ls4 For example, the Florida anti-solicitation statute may have a greater impact on the news media than on a
group seeking signatures to get a referendum on the ballot because
the latter could use other means to accomplish their goals.1s6Regardless of its label as content-neutral, the ultimate result of any exit poll
regulation would necessarily be a silencing of newscasters on election
night.
2. Analysis of the Heinrich Approach

Entrusting government with the power to control the media creates the danger of potential content manipulation by regulatory authorities. The Supreme Court has, therefore, consistently prohibited
government restrictions which are solely based on fears of how people
may react to specific
The first amendment presupposes people will act in their own best interest if information is readily available.ls7 For this reason, regulations directed a t specific types
of speech are placed under a more exacting scrutiny than a mere balancing test.
Legislation limiting certain types of communications distorts public debate. These regulations are the antithesis of a citizen's right to
163. See Stone, Content Regulation and the First Amendment, 25 Wnr. & MARY L. REV.
189, 199-200 (1983) (discussion o f the rationale behind the content-basedlcontent-neutral
distinction).
164. Id. See generally Stone, Restrictions of Speech Because of its Content: The Peculiar Case of Subject-Matter Restrictions, 46 U. CHI.L. REV.81, 100-07 (1978) (discussion o f the
societal effects o f content regulation).
165. For example, individuals interested in obtaining signatures for a referendum would
probably encounter a substantial part o f the community at local supermarkets, churches, or
shopping malls.
166. See, e.g., Police Dep't o f Chicago v. Mosley, 408 U.S. 92, 95 (1972) ("above all else,
the First Amendment means that government has no power t o restrict expression because o f its
message, its ideas, its subject matter, or its content"); Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15, 24
(1971) ("[g]overnmental bodies may not prescribe the form or content o f individual expression"); New York Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 270 (1964) ("[Dlebate on public issues
should be uninhibited, robust, and wide-open."); NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 444-45
(1963) ("[Tlhe Constitution protects expression . . . without regard t o . . . the truth, popularity, or social utility o f the ideas."); Wood v. Georgia, 370 U.S. 375, 389 (1962) ("Men are entitled t o speak as they please on matters vital t o t h e m . . . [they may not be subject to] punishment for contempt for the expression."). See generally Stone, supra note 163, at 212-13
(discussion o f content-control and the Supreme Court).
167. Cf. Note, Content Regulation and the Dimensions of Free Expression, 96 HARV.L.
REV. 1854 (1983).
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receive information free from government censorship. The Supreme
Court has, therefore, consistently invalidated statutes targeting a certain area of speech.lss For example, a city ordinance which was specifically targeted a t real estate companies and prohibited the posting
Similarly, a
of "for sale" or "sold" signs was held unconstituti~nal.~~~
city ordinance prohibiting all picketing except peaceful labor picketing was also invalidated.170 State exit polling laws selectively prohibit
a specific form of s~licitation.'~~
The Heinrich court correctly identified this infirmity and invalidated the law as an unconstitutional burden on a targeted area of speech.172
In its well reasoned opinion, the Heinrich court identified orderly
elections as the goal of Florida's exit poll legislation. Rejecting the
statute's infringement on first amendment rights, the court gave examples of alternative methods of obtaining this goal which would not
infringe on protected speech.173Under the Heinrich analysis, government cannot infringe upon the first amendment rights of the general
public in order to preserve the voting incentive of a few.17*
An appropriate constitutional analysis of exit poll legislation
should rest upon the principals espoused in Heinrich. State attempts
to limit election predictions curtail a specific speech interest. For the
Court to uphold this legislation, the government's interest in administering elections free of exit polls must be substantial enough to
pass a strict scrutiny test. In the case of exit poll restrictions, however, the government's interest in protecting a small pool of votes
does not justify the suppression of first amendment rights. Any state
legislation aimed at curtailing exit polling or early election returns
should be declared unconstitutional.
168. J. NOWAK,
supra note 27, a t 977-88. See, e.g., Metromedia, Inc. v. City of San Diego,
453 U.S. 490 (1981) (zoning ordinance distinguishing commercial and noncommercial advertising was invalidated as an unconstitutional content regulation); Carey v. Brown, 447 U.S. 455
(1980) (state statute prohibiting all picketing of residences except for peaceful labor picketing
of an employer involved in a labor dispute invalidated); Police Dep't of Chicago v. Mosley, 408
U.S. 92 (1972) (city ordinance which prohibited all picketing in front of schools except peaceful
labor picketing held invalid as a content-based regulation).
169. Linmark Assoc., Inc. v. Township of Wingboro, 431 U.S. 85 (1977). See generally
Comment, The Constitutionality of a Municipal Ordinance Prohibiting "For Sale," "Sold," or
"Open" Signs to Prevent Blockbusting, 14 ST. LOUISU.L.J. 686 (1970).
170. Carey v. Brown, 447 U.S. 455 (1980).
171. FLA.STAT.3 104.36 (1983) prohibits the distribution of political and election material, but not any other types of information.
172. See 590 F. Supp. at 930.
173. Id. at 930-31.
174. See id. The court demonstrated its unwillingness to compromise first amendment
rights of an entire jurisdiction because a few citizens were inconvenienced. On a national level,
this theory suggests that United States citizens' first amendment rights of free speech and right
to receive information should not be sacrificed at the expense of a small fraction of the
population.
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F. Congressional Legislation as a Prior Restraint of Speech
In addition to viewing a restraint on early elections as an unconstitutional content-based regulation, the Court may also perceive it
as a prior restraint.176Under the doctrine of prior restraint, the government cannot restrict speech prior to an adequate judicial determination that the first amendment does not protect the expression.176
Although the first amendment is not an absolute bar to prior restraints, any system of prior restraints is presumptively unconstituti011al.l~~
Moreover, even in cases where the presumption is rebutted,
the Court has insisted upon procedural safeguards designed to insure
as full a presentation of the matter as the circumstances permit.178In
short, the Court allows prior restraints only in exceptional cases.170
The Court has invoked the prior restraint doctrine to invalidate most
regulatory schemes of government censorship.180 The Supreme Court,
however, has been reluctant to rule on cases where its decision ultimately effects electoral ~ u t c o r n e s .Conceivably,
~~~
the Court could
choose to abstain from deciding the question at all. This, however, is
highly unlikely.
A primary concern in prior restraint cases has been that any restraint, however temporary, allows the government to destroy the immediacy of the intended speech.lS2This often deprives the speech of
175. See generally Mayton, Toward a Theory of First Amendment Process: Injunctions
of Speech, Subsequent Punishment, and the Costs of the Prior Restraint Doctrine, 67 CORNELL L. REV.245 (1982) (prior restraint doctrjnes are a necessary mandate under a democratic
system); Emerson, The Doctrine of Prior Restraint, 20 LAW& CONTEMP.
PROBS.648 (1955)
(thorough analysis of the prior restraint doctrine).
176. See Near v. Minnesota, 283 U.S. 697, 716 (1931). In Near, the Court firmly adopted
the doctrine of prior restraint. The Court presumed the chief purpose of freedom of the press
was to prevent all prior restraints of speech. Thus, the Near Court held that many schemes
constituting a prior restraint of speech are invalid under the first and fourteenth amendments.
supra note 27, a t 890-92.
Id. a t 716. See Emerson, supra note 175, at 648; J. NOWAK,
177. See New York Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 713, 714 (1971); Freedman v.
Maryland, 380 U.S. 51, 57 (1965); Bantam Books Inc. v. Sullivan, 372 U.S. 58, 70 (1963).
supra note 27, at 890-92.
178. J. NOWAK,
179. 283 U.S. a t 716. The Court listed three exceptions to the general rule that prior
restraints are forbidden: (1) publications obstructing the government's recruiting services, or
publications concerning sailing dates or the number and location of troops, (2) publications
containing obscenity, (3) publications inciting "acts of violence and the overthrow . . . of orderly government." Id.
180. L. TRIBE,supra note 28, a t 724. See, e.g., Southeastern Promotions, Ltd. v. Conrad,
420 U.S. 546 (1975) (plays); New York Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 713 (1971) (Pentagon papers); Shuttlesworth v. City of Birmingham, 394 U.S. 147 (1969) (parade permit); Freedman v. Maryland, 380 U.S. 51 (1965) (films); A Quantity of Copies of Books v. Kansas, 378 U.S.
205 (1964) (books).
181. See, e.g., O'Brien v. Brown, 409 U.S. 1 (1972) (Court unwilling to decide whether
California delegates were unconstitutionally denied a seat at the convention because such a
decision would ultimately effect the outcome of the presidential election).
182. See Carroll v. President & Comm'rs of Princess Anne, 393 U.S. 175, 182 (1968).
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its persuasiveness and, in some cases, is tantamount to permanently
preventing its dissemination. In Carroll v. President & Commissioners of Princess Anne,'8s the Court recognized that the element of
timeliness can be essential in the speech process. Even a fractional
delay in transmitting information to the public may be of critical importance.lS4 In Carroll, the respondents held a racist rally, and
planned to continue the rally on the following day. Local officials,
however, intervened with a temporary injunction.lS6Rejecting the petitioner's argument that the injunction was merely an intervention in
events which had already commenced, the Court held that the injunction was an unconstitutional prior restraint. Carroll held that the
immediate dissemination of the facts on important issues was crucial
to the operation of a democracy.1ss
The injunction in Carroll is strikingly similar to governmental attempts to eliminate exit polling and early election predictions. Arguably, however, any present government intervention in the media's
election broadcasts would not constitute a prior restraint. The judiciary might analyze legislation in the context of the 1980 election experience. This is a tenuous approach, however, because candidates and
voter behavior differ substantially from year to year. Following the
principals espoused in Carroll, any present congressional intervention
in election night broadcasts would be an interference prior to an adequate judicial determination of the legislation's constitutional
impact.
Of the various types of prior restraints, a system making speech
or publication dependent on the prior permission of government officials is the most objectionable. Under such a system, the suppression
of speech is accomplished by a "single stroke of the pen."lS7 Congressional action at this time would, ostensibly, create this forbidden system. Not only would an enactment of federal legislation be a prior
restraint of speech, it would also undermine traditional constitutional
principles in a most violative way.

VII. CONCLUSION
The Constitution's framers took steps to insure each individual an
equal access to all available information. While the government's pa183.
184.
(1964)).
185.
186.
(1964)).
187.

393 U.S. 175 (1968).
Id. at 182 (quoting A Quantity of Copies of Books v. Kansas, 378 U.S. 205, 224

Id. at 177.

Id. at 182 (quoting A Quantity of Copies of Books v. Kansas, 378 U.S. 205, 224
Jeffries, Rethinking Prior Restraint, 92 YALEL.J.409,425 (1983).
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ternalistic restrictions are laudable for attempting to ensure all votes
receive equal weight, they are contrary to the democratic idea of freedom of information. Absent a threat to national security, allowing the
government to regulate speech is a frightening proposition. If the
Congress passes legislation regulating early election predictions, the
danger exists of this restriction escalating into a much more dubious
exercise of government control. Restrictions of east coast presidential
electoral returns might u'ltimately result in a ban on the broadcast of
primary results until the last primaries have been held. Conceivably,
this limited regulatory scheme could approach total electoral
censorship.
Concededly, the broadcast of early election returns is not desirable. I t hampers the voice of a t least a small group of voters. Allowing
restrictions of election returns, however, whatever their form, would
give Congress leverage tcl eventually enact even more stringent election speech regulations. Elecause of this threat, the only realistic solution to the exit polling conflict is for the small fraction of voters affected to defer to the good of the electorate a t large. The Court in
deciding this issue must recognize that upholding any such legislation
may have the effect of encouraging future government censorship.
Congressional attempts to enact election broadcast legislation create
an unacceptable risk of suppression of information.
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